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Over the years, there have been many technological advancements in the industry and a huge 
growth in terms of operating capabilities. Being among the fastest growing organisations, 
managing enterprise wide risk effectively is a very crucial success factor. It is also recognized 
that identification and assessment of process safety risks is the cornerstone to sustain growth and 
to ensure worker and public safety.  
 
In the area of process safety, there are well-defined and established risk analysis techniques 
ranging from very simple to quite rigorous ones depending on criticality and complexity of 
application. However selection and application of appropriate technique is understood by a small 
section of workforce and often left to mere judgement of analysts. Hence they are often mistaken 
for mere theory and may not be thought of as realistic. It is onerous task upon risk analysts to 
translate these analyses in such a way that these are projected in an effective way that connects 
these results with the impact to the business outcomes.  
 
For Reliance, starting with Hazop studies, moving on to elaborate Process Hazard Analysis, 
LOPA and QRA has been a gradual journey. While traditional methodologies are applied 
throughout, there is a certain level of customisation done as per organizational needs. All such 
efforts are aimed at continuous improvement in the way risks are identified and also improve the 
quality of analysis. 
 
Group wide requirements and supporting ground rules have been defined to effectively utilize 
these methodologies in a consistent manner across various locations. Customisation also means 
applying more rigour in the analyses with less subjectivity, pre-defining criteria for choosing 
scope for quantitative analyses or the way risks are estimated. These ground rules were 
developed for both qualitative and quantitative techniques like What-if/ Hazop, Consequence 
analysis, LOPA, MAR/ QRA.  However these ground rules are aligned to current group strategy 
and can potentially undergo review in future and any required changes made.  
 
The paper discusses the evolution process in the area of Risk Assessment, challenges faced in 
realizing the actual benefits out of the assessments and how certain alterations in assessment 
methodology have helped in continual improvement of process safety and risk management.  
 
Introduction: 
A very general perception is – ‘what is generally accepted in the industry is good for all and 
should work for us’. There are always unique ways that each organisation needs to adopt to 
suit its requirements and Reliance has always endeavored to break the stereotype and 
manage operations and safety effectively.  
Initial stages of process safety implementation generated organisation wide drive to evaluate 
potential undesirable consequences due to loss of containment events across the group in a 
big way. Systematic Baseline Process Hazard Analysis was conducted across facilities with 
internal cross disciplinary teams. More rigorous techniques like Layers of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) and Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) for units with high impact potential 
and were applied for select units based on management decision. 
As a result, there was a spurt of significant number of risks emerging from the analyses, 
resulting in many recommendations to reduce risks. Majority of such analyses were based 
on consequences, which were excessively conservative. Recommendations were often 
design changes or major investments to upgrade technology. In view of various operating 
facilities, ranging from newly commissioned units to those at the end of asset lifecycle, the 
same model could not deliver desired results.  
However such efforts yielded enormous cultural and behavioural change among workforce 
through enhanced awareness on process safety, also positively impacting the company 
image. 
As the process gained further maturity, it was realised that it is required to apply judicious 
risk management principles that can result in effective resource management for risk 
reduction and that process safety does not mean indiscriminate investments.  
The initial phase of identifying risks was followed by actions for risk reduction and focus on 
barrier management. Effective application of all the process safety elements with focus on 
risk started showing overall improvement in the leading and the lagging indicators.  
Adapting traditional qualitative methods to Organisational needs: 
Hazard identification and risk assessment techniques like Hazop, what-if help determine the 
risk events that warrant risk reduction measures on priority. They also help provide a level 
of assurance to the management on the facility design and operations. These techniques 
often rely on team brainstorming and provide indicative results as perceived during the 
discussions.  
Hazop technique is applied for new facilities or where major modifications to existing 
facilities is made. For operating facilities during the cyclic reviews, what-if is applied as a 
brainstorming technique to allow team to think through risk events ranging from credible to 
worst case type failures. While both Hazop and what-if carry advantages and limitations in 
their basic design, Reliance has attempted to adopt features of both these techniques to 
derive the best out of two.  
What-if methodology is strengthened with a structural approach through aspects such as the 
following: 
 Apply ‘process deviations’ 
 Use ‘equipment specific checklists and loss of containment checklists’ 
 Review ‘What-if’ for transient operations - start-up and shut-down 
 Review ‘What-if’ for other scenarios related to typical industry and unit specific 
aspects such as Instrumentation, Chemical Hazards, Equipment Integrity, rupture/leak, 
Relief, etc. 
Above approach helps apply rigour in the way complex processes are analysed for risks and 
prompts analysis teams not to miss out on key aspects. 
Risk events thus identified are subject to risk ranking for prioritisation through Risk Matrix 
defined for the organisation. This is used consistently in the analysis as a single lens to view 
all types of operational risks after a clear understanding was provided from top to bottom 
layers of organisation. Interpretation tables are designed to estimate consequences to People, 
Environment, Assets and Reputation. 
Figure-1 Risk Matrix (sample) 
 
 
While the qualitative techniques are strengthened to bring out the right risk events, the 
management observed there were inconsistencies and occasional fallacies in the analysis due 
to the subjectivity and heavy dependency on team judgement.  
Consequence based approach: 
First step towards rationalisation of the estimates was to quantify consequences through 
modeling in software tool based on globally accepted assumptions. These results helped in 
gaining better confidence in the estimates to help determine risk reduction actions.  
Consequence based decisions brought a big shift in the way risks are viewed and gave an 
insight to those worst events that normally cannot be imagined even by an experienced 
team.  
However an unexpected outcome of this approach is an increase in the number of proposals 
for risk reduction and there were signs of being over conservative creeping in. Typical 
recommendations were to install additional detectors in existing units, inclusion of 
redundant instrumentation in design and many other design changes. Further questions arose 
about the limit to such changes and how the residual risk is projected after they are 
implemented. It was realized that management has such a huge number of actions to 
approve, many of them required for high hazard operations. There are also potential 
disadvantages to adding more hardware to the unit. 
Examples of such situations are: A facility that operated for 30 years, handling hazardous 
material with standard safety practices in place was subject to a what-if analysis and 
subsequently consequence analysis. The results showed up levels of concern that prompted 
that analysis team to recommend major metallurgy and instrumentation changes. Decisions 
on this unit were prioritised and consequences determined the actions. Soon after the 
changes were made with heavy investments, the business operations became quite unviable 
and were discontinued.  
Another small facility with very small amounts of hazardous material was analysed through 
PHA, which indicated that there are many high severity risk events in the unit. There was a 
QRA study performed to confirm these results. Results did not indicate the same level of 
risk, ruling out the apprehensions generated based on PHA results. 
These cases prompted that an overly conservative consequence based approach could be, at 
times, detrimental to the overall business objectives. An in-depth analysis of the business 
value obtained from the facility versus risks involved should have been a prudent approach 
in the first case. In the second case, appropriately QRA technique was applied to avoid over 
estimates and re-engineering.   
Getting the risk estimates right: 
The approach taken for various methodologies applied in risk assessments is depicted in 
Figure-2 below. As per traditional qualitative methodologies, only net risk estimates were 
made during Hazard evaluation based on existing barriers. There was a need identified to 
upgrade this philosophy to enable representing the significance of controls/ barriers in a 
better manner. 
In addition to net risk estimates, requirements have been laid out that each risk event is 
subjected to analysis that estimates failure of all existing barriers depicting the ‘inherent or 
worst credible risk’ to provide further visibility on the worst potential of the risk event. The 
inherent risk always reminds management and the asset facing personnel of the significance 
of effectively managing those risks which otherwise can be bad for the organisation. 
Assessment of inherent risk for each scenario is performed on qualitative basis, estimates 
made initially based on review of incident history and team judgement. Such qualitative 
estimates are further refined in quantitative risk analysis (QRA) for high severity risks.  
While performing the inherent risk estimates, guidance is provided for teams to adopt a 
conservative approach in not crediting such factors those are not designed protect against a 
particular risk event, e.g., favourable meteorological conditions, population patterns in the 
area at the time of incident, non-ignition of flammable vapours and successful emergency 
response actions including evacuation. This is especially valid while considering incident 
occurrence frequency, i.e., those occurred in the facility lifetime or in the organisation.  
This means that an incident where the flammable cloud did not ignite due to prevalent 
conditions at the time of the incident should be analysed estimating ‘what worse could 
happen if the same cloud had ignited’. Any unusual response actions taken during the 
incident, which are not planned for, should also not be assumed will happen in future during 
the likelihood estimates.  
The approach mentioned above relies heavily on maintaining a good incident database for 
review by the analysis teams. This exercise otherwise may still be ineffective if left for mere 
judgement.  
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Net risk estimates and decreasing subjectivity: 
Combining the qualitative analyses with the quantified consequence estimates gave a 
reasonable level of confidence in the results. However there was still scope of improvement 
in the frequency estimates. There have been a few articles published in forums like the 
‘Global Congress on Process Safety’ that mention how HAZIDs and HAZOPs are integrated 
with LOPA principles. 
On similar lines, Reliance has devised an internal calibration scale that directionally guides 
the teams on applying credits for barriers. This is helpful because application of LOPA 
technique for all the scenarios is also not feasible considering the number of scenarios to be 
analysed. Hierarchy of controls as the basis, a qualitative rule set for taking credits on 
likelihood was developed.  
For e.g., an alarm with operator action will enable movement by only one level on the scale 
where there is a common event like a minor leak from primary seal of a pump. Further 
credits to the scale can only be taken upon higher safeguards, say addition of an emergency 
shutdown system.  
The scale does not allow likelihood estimates to be able to determine that ‘a scenario has a 
very remote possibility to occur (say scale 1 or 2 in the table below)’ unless there are 
inherently safer mechanisms included in the design. Examples include design like the pipe-
in-pipe, eliminating potential failure points in the process like the stagnant zones prone to 
corrosion, rapid deinventorying through gravity, etc. 
Figure-3 Frequency estimate table (Representative sample) 
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Note : When making net likelihood estimates, move boxes to the left only if the controls 
mentioned in the left scale exist; Else position remains 
 
However based on a common criteria set for the organisation, scenarios with high severity 
potential are analysed through LOPA technique which is less subjective and more reliable. 
Risk estimates analysed through LOPA are re-mapped into the Risk Matrix and results from 
PHA corrected, as required. 
Above principles are also applied for future risk estimates made for proposed risk reduction 
measures. Under some cases, these future estimates are performed quantitatively. This 
projection of future risk helps in taking decisions on risk reduction measures by the 
management.  
The journey towards customizing risk assessment techniques has been gradual, and the 
upgradation of risk assessment methodology based on findings from internal processes for 
quality assurance. Hence such incremental changes to the process should be tailor-made for 
each organisation as per the requirements. 
Application of risk estimates in overall process safety: 
The risk assessment studies performed on units have a larger impact on the overall 
operations the unit when applied across other key processes that can be linked to various 
elements of process safety, e.g., Asset Criticality & Mechanical integrity, Management of 
Change (MoC), Auditing & Assurance.   
Journey towards Risk Based Process Safety requires close integration between each of these 
elements and all of them aligned to the identified risks.  
Reliance has invested a lot of efforts in integration of all the key processes like critical 
equipment identification & integrity management, incident management, MoC with the Risk 
process. All these processes rely on the risk assessments as the basis to determine criticality 
and enforce focused actions on high risk items.   
Risk and Process Safety Competency – a critical factor in the journey: 
It is well understood across industry that each change management requires a major shift in  
the thought process in the organisation across various levels. Training the risk analysis 
teams at facility level is the first step which typically consumes the maximum efforts. 
Principles mentioned above not only require understanding of traditional Hazard 
identification methods but also the concepts of LOPA and QRA. These are rigorous 
techniques and usually there are only a few resources who are trained in applying them. This 
has been an area of challenge to continually improve process safety competency across the 
facilities. To make model simpler for asset facing personnel, customisation of the rule set 
using the Risk Matrix in combination with the LOPA principles proved beneficial.  
The next level was to get the leadership appreciate the enhanced understanding of barriers in 
risk management and the need for shift in the application of the risk assessment tools. A 
significant contributing factor in managing the program effectively is that the key decision 
makers understand the assumptions and principles. There are ongoing efforts in facilitating 
Competency development programs for leadership and the analysis teams to bridge any gaps 
in knowing and applying the requirements. 
Process safety subcommittees at each facility help in steering these efforts to engage wider 
group of stakeholders and helps in achieving effective communication. Continuous 
upgradation of in-house competency is achieved by partnering with external groups with 
process safety expertise, active participation in global forums, getting personnel training on 
focused areas through external expert groups, etc.  
Give time! 
Through the journey in the shift from one set of requirements to another, it has been an 
experience that the changes take time to be realised at ground level. A critical factor is to 
‘Give Time’ for any changes to get absorbed and matured. It is clearly evident across the 
industry that any number of changes made to the documents do not yield results, unless a 
systematic and steady headway is made in the translating them to actions. Risk Assessment 
can be a better tool in managing & prioritising operating risks but does not compensate for 
basic principles and best practices of operations to achieve safe and reliable operations.  
 
 
  
 
